Political parties today can best be understood not only as a series of committees with offices on Capitol Hill, but as webs of relationships between political actors. Two partisan networks, one Democratic and one Republican, assist candidates, plot campaign strategies, and coordinate governing tasks. While the notion of parties as more hierarchical and formal organizations in the style of Tammany Hall or Mayor Daley's Chicago may have made sense in an earlier age, the network concept helps explain much political activity in the modern era (Bedlington and Malbin 2003; Bernstein and Dominguez 2003; Bernstein 1999 Bernstein , 2000 Bernstein , and 2004 Bimes and Dominguez 2004; Cohen et al 2008; Doherty 2003 Doherty , 2005 Doherty , and 2006 Dominguez 2003 and 2005a; Heberlig and Larson 2005 and Kolodny 1998; Kolodny and Kolodny and Logan 1998; Masket 2009; Schlesinger 1985 , Schwartz 1990 Skinner 2004 Skinner , 2005 Skinner , and 2007 ).
The rapid growth of 527s in the wake of the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act in 2002 appears to have bolstered the reshaping of parties as networks. 527s were created by leading operatives in both major parties, using them to fulfill the functions previously supported by soft money: broadcast advertising and voter mobilization. Probably the most notable 527s
were those that composed a Democratic "shadow party": America Coming Together, America Votes, and the Media Fund. There were Republican 527s as well, including Progress for America and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. Of course, there were many pre-existing 527 organizations, such as those operated by the Sierra Club and the League of Conservation Voters.
Whatever these groups accomplished, they did not undermine the role of political parties.
Party leaders encouraged their formation, longtime party operatives composed their staffs, partisan interest groups lent them assistance and partisan donors contributed their funds. The 527 groups generally pursued strategies compatible with party goals, whether America Coming Together's mobilization of Democratic-leaning voters or the Swift Boat Vets' criticism of John Kerry's Vietnam record. The 527 groups were not competing with the parties; they were nodes within the broader party networks (Skinner 2005) . Pope, EMILY's List president Ellen Malcolm (who also serves on the DNC's executive committee), SEIU president Andrew Stern, and former AFL-CIO political director Steve Rosenthal. They agreed on the need to coordinate interest-group electoral operations; this became America Votes (Weissman and Hassan 2006) Stern and Rosenthal also discussed their desire to create a "ground war" operation funded by unions, and that would apply to the general public the voter-turnout techniques used to mobilize union members. This eventually became America Coming Together; billionaire George Soros and insurance tycoon Peter Lewis pledged $20 million to fund ACT as long as Rosenthal controlled its operations (Weissman and Hassan 2006) Votes allowed member organizations to share voter files, survey data, and demographic information. This allowed America Votes staff to coordinate the efforts of groups such as the Sierra Club, NARAL Pro-Choice America, and the League of Conservation Voters in stimulating voter turnout and contacting swing voters. America Votes targeted 13 battleground states; the organization remained active in later elections at a lower level of activity (Hadfield 2004) .
2 The groups involved in America Votes are central elements in the Democratic Party network; they put the lie to the conventional wisdom that interest groups always undermine political parties.
The Democratic "shadow party" was primarily funded by a few very large donors, many of them who had given large amounts of "soft money" to party committees. These included some leading unions, such as AFSCME, SEIU, the Teamsters, and the American Federation of
Teachers. But there were also several large individual donors who had been longtime supporters of the Democratic Party, most notably Soros and Lewis.
A Republican "Shadow"
Republicans were initially reluctant to set up their own 527 organizations; the RNC had never depended as much on soft money as the DNC had, the Bush re-election campaign could raise as much money as it needed, and the legal status of 527's seemed shaky at first. But eventually a Republican "shadow" emerged. deference is paid to the leadership, activists are expected to be "good soldiers,"
and competing loyalties are frowned upon.
Democrats feel comfortable engaging in formal recognition of diversity; Republicans avoid it when they can. Democrats demand open discussion and representativeness;
Republicans prefer top-down leadership and demonstrations of unity. Democratic conventions have seen numerous fights over credentials and legitimacy, while the Republicans usually rally around their nominee (Freeman 1986 ). Shafer (1986) notes differences between the parties' delegates, with Democrats more given to flamboyant displays of individualism, while Republicans prefer deference to authority and reliance on formal channels of communication. Klinkner (1995) Open clashes over philosophy rarely occurred among Republicans, even after major defeats. Occasionally, the GOP will woo specific constituencies, as the RNC's Southern Division did in the 1960s, or as Brock courted Evangelicals and blue-collar workers during the Carter presidency. But overt group consciousness cuts against the grain of a party culture that emphasizes homogeneity and hierarchy (Klinkner 1995) .
Democratic culture tends to accommodate groups to a much greater extent. This reflects not only differences in folkways, but also the reality of the internal dynamics of the party. Berry (1999) finds that liberal citizen groups, many of them active in Democratic politics, have far outstripped their conservative counterparts in influence and prestige. The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, especially those involving women and African-Americans, usually preferred to participate in the Democratic party,
given its support for activist government and openness to out-groups. By contrast, Republican women were recruited through pre-existing partisan channels; efforts by GOP feminists to gain greater recognition bore little fruit (Baer and Bostitis 1988) . Dark (1998) illustrates a decades-long alliance between organized labor and the Democratic Party; one in which there has been more continuity than change. Indeed, Republican operatives have often envied unions' success at grassroots organizing; both the Christian Coalition and the RNC's "72-Hour Project" were modeled, in part, on labor's turnout efforts.
By contrast, while business has funded the GOP since the days of McKinley and
Hanna, corporations otherwise avoid overt political involvement. One prominent lobbyist for a peak business association has commented, "Business traditionally doesn't like politics. I mean, it's just easier to write a check, it's easier to contribute to a candidate, a party" (Skinner 2007) . Urban machines long served as a valuable base for the Democratic Party, receiving in return for their labor-intensive operations, not only patronage but also recognition for their ethnic constituents. Republican Party organization has usually been stronger at the state and national levels, and has relied more on capital-intensive techniques like advertising (Erie 1990; Klinkner 1995 Republicans have their own ideological devotees, but they rarely concern themselves with procedural reform. If anything, the rise of conservatism in the 1960s and 1970s only increased the homogeneity within the GOP (Miller and Jennings 1986) .
Testing the Network Model
From what we know about party networks from both past scholarship and anecdotal accounts of 527s as shadow parties we develop and test the following hypotheses: 1) 527s are a central component to the party network by being connected to formal party structures and institutions as well as campaigns and other interest groups; 2) 527s facilitate coordination between disparate groups in the party network; and 3) there are important differences in the structure and behavior of the Democratic and Republican party networks. Once a sample of 527s was identified, the data used to test the above hypotheses were collected through several stages. First, because we were interested in the connections individuals associated with 527 organizations have to the wider party network, we needed to identify a data source that provided consistent and reliable information on those individuals responsible for starting, the daily operation of, and strategic direction of each 527 organization. We could have done a simple Google search to try and identify key players in each 527, but that would have been too unreliable, as we could not know for sure if we had collected all the key individuals at each organization. Because each are organized differently (for instance, some are more decentralized than others; some are more hierarchical than others; some have larger staff structures than others, etc.) we could not be confident that a simple search through an Internet search engine would be exhaustive. along with their 990. The 8871, again, is the form a group must file to notify the IRS that they are requesting 527 status; any change to a group, be it an address change, or more importantly for our purposes, a change in the officers or key staff, must be accompanied by an amended 8871; thus the need for multiple filings.
In order to come to a final list of "officers, directors, trustees, and key employees" we The resulting dataset is, in a way, incomplete. While we know the links between each 527 and its affiliated groups, we are less certain about the links from one affiliated group to another. For example, the 527 EMILY's List is tied to the Human Rights Campaign and the Gore 2000 presidential campaign through personnel. It is certainly possible that HRC and the Gore campaign had personnel in common, as well. However, this dataset does not contain such information.
Results
Our data were collected in the form of a grid, with 527s as columns and the associations to which the 527 employees belonged (henceforth "affiliated groups") as rows. This dataset was then analyzed as a two-mode matrix using UCINET 6.214, NetDraw 2.084, Pajek 1.02, and igraph 0.5.2. Where necessary for the purposes of analysis, the two-mode matrix was converted to a bipartite matrix, with both 527s and affiliated groups appearing in both the rows and columns. The two-mode analysis allows us to see the relationships between the 527s and the other organizations with which they are affiliated. Our data recorded the number of employees documenting the PR and propaganda activities of public relations firms and public relations professionals engaged in managing and manipulating public perception, opinion and policy. SourceWatch also includes profiles on think tanks, industry-funded organizations and industry-friendly experts that work to influence public opinion and public policy on behalf of corporations, governments and special interests. Over time, SourceWatch has broadened to include others involved in public debates including media outlets, journalists and government agencies. Unlike some other wikis, SourceWatch has a policy of strict referencing, and is overseen by a paid editor. SourceWatch has 37,220 articles" that 527s shared with affiliated groups, and the networks were therefore analyzed as valued datasets.
We can visually track the links between 527s and organization in Figure 1 , which charts out the entire 527 network. For the sake of clarity, isolates (nodes with zero connections) were omitted from this diagram.
This image and others were created using NetDraw's "spring-embedding" algorithm, with nodes repositioned slightly to improve readability. The node sizes are weighted by the The Democratic dominance of this network is no doubt due to the fact that there are many more (www.sourcewatch.org). We believe the last two sentences are key to having confidence in the information on this site, as opposed to a page such as Wikipedia.
Democratic 527s than Republican ones. Indeed, as mentioned previously, of the 100 largest 527s we examined, 67 were affiliated with the Democrats, 18 with the Republicans.
Another somewhat surprising feature of the network is that it does not appear to be Despite the bipartisanship of this network, the structure itself provides insight into the nature of a modern political party. Consistent with the view that a modern party is best thought of as a expanded network of political actors, rather than just a hierarchy within a formal organization, the 527 image shows that interest groups are vital players.
An "egonet" image for one 527, Americans Coming Together, is displayed in Figure 2 , and shows just how connected this 527 is. ACT has direct personnel connections to nearly three dozen leading Democratic associations, including presidential campaigns, interest groups, and formal party organizations. This is a group that is clearly pivotal within the party. Rather than a fringe group with only loose ties to partisan actors, it is in a position to broker communications between various groups within the party.
Figure 2
To further examine the network structure of the parties, it is helpful to separate out the networks charted by Republican and Democratic 527s. Direct comparisons between different networks are somewhat challenging, particularly when the networks are of different sizes (Anderson et al. 1999 ). There exist a number of graph-level indices (GLIs) that could help in comparisons, but common GLIs like density (the number of existing connections divided by the number of possible connections) are easily influenced by the total number of nodes in a network.
Nonetheless, researchers have developed various ways to compare networks either by controlling for size (Bonacich et al. 1998) or by using measures that are resistant to changes in N (Faust and Skvoretz 2002 , Faust 2006 , Snijders 1981 , Snijders and Baerveldt 2003 . We largely pursue the latter approach.
Our first method involves calculating normalized Bonacich alpha power scores for all the nodes in the networks and then testing to see if those scores are distributed differently across parties (Bonacich 1987 ). Bonacich power scores essentially determine the influence of each node with respect to its surrounding nodes. The distribution of these scores among the two networks can be seen in Figure 3 , a kernel density plot in which each party's scores have been adjusted to have the same mean.
Figure 3
As the figure shows, the Republican network has a somewhat broader range of alpha power scores, while the Democratic nodes are more concentrated around zero. A KolmogorovSmirnov test reveals that the Republican Party network's power score distribution is significantly different from that of the Democrats' (P = .000). Additionally, an F-test confirms that the Republican network's power scores have a higher standard deviation (36.23) than do the Democrats' (31.70) a difference that is highly statistically significant (p ≤ .001).
5 What this suggests is that there is a wider range of power status in the Republican Party and somewhat greater equality of nodes within the Democratic Party, suggesting that the GOP is the more hierarchical of the two.
Another useful way to compare the two parties' networks is through visual illustration.
The network charted by the 18 Republican-affiliated 527s in our dataset appears in Figure 4 . The 527s are depicted as square nodes and are labeled. The affiliated groups are depicted as circles.
This is a relatively thin network (partially due to its small size). For this network, we conducted the community detection algorithm designed by Girvan and Newman (2002) consisting largely of labor unions, and a third (in gray) consisting of artistic and campaigning pursuits. A few other communities address particular interests within the coalition. There is no obviously dominant community within the Democratic network, unlike within its Republican counterpart. Again this lends support for the notion that the Republican party has the more hierarchical organization.
Figure 5
Table 1 provides a set of descriptive statistics for each of the two parties' networks, as calculated by igraph. These statistics are highly informative about the hierarchical nature of each network. They can be defined as follows:
• Degree -The average measure of degree centrality (the number of direct connections with other nodes) for all nodes in the network, with standard deviations in parentheses.
• Degree-degree correlation -The Pearson correlation of the degree centrality for each ego and its alter. If the correlation is highly positive, then nodes tend to be connected to other nodes that are as connected as they are. If the correlation is negative, it suggests a more hierarchical network in which highly connected nodes are linked to relatively isolated nodes.
• Average clustering coefficient -The clustering coefficient measures how closely each node and its immediate neighbors constitute a complete graph (or a "small world").
The statistics portrayed in this table suggest some similarities and differences across the two networks. The nodes in the Democratic networks, interestingly, have a somewhat higher degree centrality than those in the Republican network, although that difference is much smaller than the standard deviation for either network.
Table 1
The degree-degree correlations for both networks are negative but essentially identical to each other. The clustering coefficients, meanwhile, are small for both parties, suggesting that very few nodes and their immediate neighbors constitute a "small world" in these networks.
However, the figure is higher for the Democratic network, indicating a somewhat less hierarchical world. These measures tend toward a conclusion that the Republican Party is the more hierarchical of the two. Table 2 and Table 3 list the ten most central 527s in the Republican and Democratic networks, respectively. They are listed in declining order of degree centrality (number of connections). However, two other measures of centrality are listed here, as well: betweenness and Eigenvector. In both tables, the highest score in one measure corresponds to the highest in the other two, giving us greater confidence that we have identified the truly important 527s in each party. These appear to be Republican National Lawyers in the GOP and Environment 2004 among the Democrats, although those groups have close rivals. Table 2 and Table 3 A final bit of analysis involves collapsing the two-mode datasets into one-mode datasets, focusing on the affiliated organizations within each party. This is done to address the question of what 527s allow a party to do. Projecting a one-mode matrix from a two-mode one does have its drawbacks. The main drawback is that such projection tends to exaggerate clustering (Latapy et al 2008 , Nyhan 2009 ). Thus we do not examine these networks for community structures.
Nonetheless, these projections are useful for identifying the critical organizations within each party, understanding how they interact with the aid of 527s, and examining differences between the parties.
As with the two-mode network, we calculated normalized Bonacich alpha power scores and examined their distributions, which can be seen in Figure 6 . Again, the Republican nodes seem to have a broader distribution of power. An F-test confirms that the Republican power scores have the higher standard deviation (33.61 compared to the Democrats' 27.97), a difference that is statistically significant (p ≤ .001).
Figure 6
Table 4 shows the same set of statistics that we saw in Table 1 , only for one-mode networks that are collapsed around the affiliated groups. Of note is that the degree centrality of nodes is much higher in the Democratic one-mode network than in the Republican one.
Interestingly, the degree-degree correlation is higher for Republicans (.270 compared to .045),
suggesting that well-connected nodes are more likely to be connected to similarly connected nodes within the Republican network. Similarly, while the clustering coefficients are high in both networks, it is somewhat higher among Republicans, suggesting that "small worlds" are more common within the Republican network. These findings are somewhat mixed as to which party's network has the more hierarchical structure.
Table 4
We next turn to graphical depictions of these projected one-mode networks. Figure 7 shows the organizations tied to each other through Republican 527s. The nodes are weighted by betweenness centrality, again emphasizing those with key positions to facilitate information and personnel transfers throughout the party network. While there are a great many relatively minor groups, both from the political and business communities, the more central ones are easily identified. The RNC occupies a central role in the network, as do the three most recent
Republican presidential administrations. Two private groups, the Club for Growth and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, seem to act as a pivots between several other groups. These are all obviously important Republican organizations, and the 527s allow them to coordinate.
Figure 7
The Democratic one-mode network, shown in Figure 
Discussion
This analysis has demonstrated that 527s are important and central to the broader party networks in the American political system. Through their personnel connections, 527s are far from being fringe groups; they are in a position to facilitate collective action among virtually all key party actors. Parties, after all, are not just a collection of activists, donors, and formal party groups; they are all these actors coordinating efforts. It appears from this study that 527s do much to enable this coordination.
This analysis was also able to determine the community structure of the party networks, finding important differences between the parties. While both parties maintain some degree of hierarchy, the preponderance of visual and quantitative evidence supports a conclusion that the Republican network is the more hierarchical of the two. This is actually consistent with much of the literature on the two parties' organizational styles. It is certainly possible that our finding is a function of a particular time period during which the Democratic Party controlled neither the Congress nor the White House and relied extensively upon 527s to aid in party coordination.
However, we might expect the Democrats to be the more hierarchical party under such circumstances; it is somewhat surprising to find these historical party traits holding even at a time when hierarchy would have been so advantageous for the Democrats.
By collapsing the two-mode matrices into one-mode ones, we were able to identify the key actors in each party network and to demonstrate how 527s enable collaboration between them. The resulting images were a stark confirmation of the common images of the two parties, with both dominated by presidential administrations and the formal party groups, but the Republicans also reserving a key place for conservative advocacy groups and the Democrats dominated by labor unions.
One of the surprising findings in our study was the level of bipartisanship in the overall 527 network. These cross-party connections may be only superficial in nature -it is doubtful that there is much strategic coordination between the League of Conservation Voters and the Club for Growth -but there are too many of them to dismiss them as mere noise. This may suggest something inherently different about the people who group together as 527s when compared to those who work within the more traditional party groups.
In the future, we hope to examine the different sorts of networks charted out by different types of employees. For example, technical staffers (fundraisers, human resources personnel, etc.) may produce a more bipartisan network than political staffers. We also hope to examine how these networks change over time. The emergence of a new presidential administration in opportunity to observe the dynamics of party networks. 
